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Tort Trends in 1957*
Melvin M. Belli**
The Adequate Award
T o DISCUSS FURTHER the theory here of the Adequate Award
might be to overprove the now apparent. But what is not
apparent to plaintiffs' lawyers is that most insurance companies
have become aware of the Adequate Award, have adjusted their
premiums upward; they have tried to give currency to their
actuarial figures, rather than wait the one or two years lag which
sometimes is devastating to a company's finances.
But it is still necessary for counsel to pause during the trial
of a law suit to examine "inflation" (or whatever it is now called).
A jury must be reminded (as must counsel himself) how few
quarts, feet, seconds or bites the dollar "goes" today. The $40
or $50 a day charged by skilled labor, the 50¢ and $1.00 for the
five-cent commodity, the lack of response to the 25¢ and 50¢ tip,
and, indeed, almost the disdain for money itself, as a yardstick,
must shock one's conscience. It should shock a conscientious
plaintiff's lawyer, "liberal" on the subject of damages, as much
as the accountant actuary for a conservative casualty company.
Both use the same dollar yardstick for the same commodities of
life, a college education, a coffin, an automobile, a farm, flowers
for an injured plaintiff, a surgeon's fees.
Amputated legs were "selling" at around $35,000 in 1940.
They now "bring" on the open market over $100,000.
Is this shocking? Had I bought $10,000 of Life Insurance
Company stock' in 1943, that $10,000 today would be worth
$238,000-and I would have received $12,600 in dividends! Soon,
we may all realize that a share of stock in an insurance company
shouldn't increase in value, as time goes on, more than a leg.
The theory of the Adequate Award is easy to absorb.
While some areas, noticeably the New England states (with
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the exception of Massachusetts), Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Alaska and Honolulu remain "low verdict cen-
ters," the general trend upward continues everywhere, not only
in verdicts but in settlements. Federal court verdicts have been
generally larger than State court verdicts in the same jurisdic-
tion. And almost universally, a trend (not perceived and not
even admitted by most plaintiffs' lawyers), showing Judge awards
have proportionately jumped upwards compared to jury awards.
The exception is the volatile "all or nothing" case and the case of
"good liability" and most serious damages, the $200,000 and
$300,000 class. (Federal tort claim judgments where no jury is
allowed have been entered for amounts comparable or even
higher to jury awards in the same community.)
With the new industry and economy in the Southern states,
verdicts there generally have kept apace. Mississippi and Texas
continue upward although Texas is "spotty" still. Alabama gives
promise of increasing awards, and indeed has done so in several
instances.
Florida is not uniquely southern, and the adequacy of its
awards can, in large part, be attributed to its unique six-man
jury makeup (women may sit but rarely do).
South Carolina awards have tended upward, but generally
are still low. North Carolina is one of the lowest verdict cen-
ters in the United States. This may be directly attributable
to the lack of cooperation between doctors and lawyers in that
state, and the control of litigation (not the courts) and medical
proof by corporate interests.
The State of Washington is extremely low in awards and
settlements in the Eastern portion around Spokane, but on the
Pacific seaboard, i.e., Seattle, verdicts recently have moved pre-
cipitously upward. Oregon still remains a tragically low verdict
center but with several "break throughs" and the promise given,
as with Alabama that it is "ready" to take its place in the Union
of Adequacy, where the commodities of personal injury and
wrongful death are not treated as vices and diseases but as
capacities adequately to be compensated under the law of the
whole land-not the provincial land.
Dollar a Day Argument
The argument breaking down pain and suffering into periods
of time and inviting a jury to consider so much in dollars ("$2 a
day argument"-See 1 BELLI, MODERN TRIALS 870-872) for each
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day or hour, etc., was approved as one legitimate means of
admeasuring these elements of general damages in Imperial Oil
Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F. 2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956). It was thought that
this case, with others, now indicated the overwhelming weight
of authority.
But, we dip into 1958 to find a most disturbing decision
from the Supreme Court of New Jersey, decided Feb. 3, 1958,
Nancy Botta v. Herman Brunner, et al., 26 N. J. 82. This court,
collating all the available authority, both case and text law,
comments that the question is novel in New Jersey/, then pro-
scribes the "right of plaintiffs' counsel in personal injury dam-
age suits to suggest monetary mathematical formulas to a jury
for the computation of compensation for pain and suffering."
The New Jersey Court relied heavily upon the singular and
unrealistic procedures of the neighboring state of Pennsylvania
where counsel may not even suggest to a jury for what amount
he is suing and in fact what really the law suit is all about!
This New Jersey case is decidedly and distinctly against trial
and tort trends in almost every jurisdiction, but it is a storehouse
of citations.
"Secret" Evidence
There is a growing tendency to treat much available evi-
dence as "secret" in civilian courts: The Interstate Commerce
Commission, for example, requires a full report of an accident
from carriers under its jurisdiction. An honest and accurate
report is generally forthcoming because, even though such a
report is available to both litigants' counsel on the writing and
asking, the content of such report cannot be used in any manner
in evidence directly, in cross examination, or indirectly.
Other state and national boards have similar requirements,
both as to reports and the privilege attendant upon it. The theory,
of course, behind the privilege is that if the report were manda-
tory but could be used against the party mandated, not only
would constitutional questions arise, but, practically, honest
reports might be forthcoming.
I have heretofore discussed what to do when counsel has
such a report available before him on the actual trial of the
case and opposing counsel attempts to impress the jury that a
different cause than that reported occasioned the accident: The
privileged or "secret" report should be introduced "for identifica-
tion" only (never shown to the trier of the facts for its full
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probative value), and opposing counsel should be cited for con-
tempt for disavowing his duty as an officer of the court and
attempting to convince the jury (or the trier of facts) that an
unfactual event occurred, i.e., compare the report with what the
lawyer said.
The requirement of such reports with the attendant pro-
hibition against their use increases with the many new state
and national boards and commissions by which man, his com-
merce, his industry and his every breath is increasingly regu-
lated. For the present, at least, we leave to the legislatures the
decisions as to whether public policy "for the greater good"
overweighs individual justice i.e., a disclosure in court as to the
cause of the accident at bar versus nondisclosure and a true
report that may be used to prevent future accidents.
What concerns us is the growing tendency on the part of
the military, and its many branches and subdivisions (It's diffi-
cult to tell where the military leaves off and civilian activities
begin), to say of the facts of an accident, "They are secret!"
A military airplane falls out of the sky, a whole city block is
destroyed, the living bodies are left with mangled limbs or lives
are exploded out. Suits are filed and the usual discoveries and
depositions are commenced, only to be met with, "Yes, we made
a full investigation, and we know the cause of the accident, but
that's a military secret-we can't tell you." In the case of
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1 (1953), a B-29, which was
obsolete at the time, was held to involve a military secret when
discovery was demanded.
Of course, it is necessary in many instances to keep secret
for the greater good, the security of the nation, evidence which
might entitle an individual to recover in a law suit. But the
absurdity of some rulings is manifest when that which is claimed
secret pro forma has already appeared in national magazines, in
speeches, in the public press, not only of this country but abroad.
There is no "secret" about it except in court. Everybody may
"know" the answer, but still it remains hearsay unless it comes
from the lips of a responsible first-hand person in court. These
are the cases that impress with an unsalutory illegal bureaucratic
trend.
If the matter has already been published and if it's true,
what damage could there be to "national security" in the re-
telling? There can be much more damage from the inference
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that the matter is neither true nor wholesome for us to hear
officially!
An unhappy extension of this "secret evidence" or "privi-
lege" trend is expressed in Wojciechowski v. Baron, 80 N. W.
2d 434 (Wisc. 1957). The report of the accident from the assured
to the insurance company was held "privileged," could not be
seen, and was not admissible in evidence in the personal injury
action, assured being the defendant sued.
See Doherty v. Shamley, 132 A. 2d 862 (D. C. 1957), the
attorney for the insurance company was not required to pro-
duce the signed statement of the driver of the vehicle involved
in the collision. (It was said that plaintiff had his name and
address and could take his deposition. Certainly he could be
examined on the statement then).
Jury "Fixing"!
The most apparent, to me, insidious and brazen of "TRIAL
AND TORT TRENDS OF 1957" is the procedure of "fixing" juries in
personal injury cases, particularly the malpractice case! The
new attempt is at once more indirect and insidious but even
more effective: A doctor is sued in malpractice. As soon as a
jury is selected, the wives of all doctors of the particular com-
munity spontaneously appear in the courtroom, eagerly to
profess their interests in the law suit. Their presence subtly
and not so subtly warns the jurors "The doctor on trial is a
friend of my husband. Some of you are patients of my husband.
If you vote defendant 'guilty' of malpractice, my husband, your
doctor, won't like it!"
I saw this procedure tried in Omaha, Nebraska, in Spokane,
Washington, in San Diego, California and in eastern courts.
The procedure was apparently "directed from above." It ap-
peared too spontaneously, too generally, to have been undirected.
In Spokane, Washington, there was started a "Citizens Com-
mittee" for the "protection of doctors," during the course of
trial! Neighbors of prospective jurors, tradesmen, and those who
could directly or indirectly "get" to the jury were solicited for
membership. Too, the leading newspaper was asked to run
stories and "editorials."
Plaintiffs' lawyers are criticized for "trial by newspaper."
Is this criticism an anticipatory defense and forerunner to
planned newspaper publicity in defendant's cases? Defendant is
generally the "monied interest" in the community. He's likely
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to have more of a relationship, both business and official, with the
editor of the local newspaper than the plaintiff, Joe Acropolis,
the stevedore who was run over by defendant's truck. I have
found most newspaper men and editors more conscious than
lawyers in realizing the ethical duties of the press during pend-
ency of litigation. They know that "freedom of the press" de-
pends upon press good behavior and they know what is good
behavior.
But, in a number of instances recently, not only have edi-
torials and newspaper reporters slanted stories during the trial,
but men from the public relations department of the defendant
on trial have attended hearings every day, adding encourage-
ment and "interpretation" to the day's proceedings-and to the
press reports.
Too, in the malpractice case, that very human man, usually
of good and great ethics and integrity, the family doctor, seems
to forget his "bringing up." Too many times will he discuss the
case with a juror or a juror's neighbor while the malpractice
case of one of his brethren is on trial.
It's true that there are more malpractice cases than ever
before, and the relationship between doctors and lawyers has
worsened to the point where "something drastic should be done."
But that "something" is not the destruction of the jury system
by receiving "expert advice" out of court!
Lawyers Learning Medicine
At last, many centers of learning have taken cognizance of
the need for medico-legal training. Doctors everywhere are being
lectured upon "legal relationships." They are told how to keep
records, how to testify. They are told what is "hearsay," what
is "expert" as distinguished from "lay" testimony, what is the
"hypothetical question."
Fortunately, there is a definite trend toward teaching law-
yers medicine. Without a doctor's prognosis, there would be a
nonsuit, at least on the issue of damages. The recently grad-
uated lawyer is not equipped to settle a case with the medically
knowledgeable insurance adjuster, nor is he prepared to go into
court against the defense insurance counsel, who is as much





Whether because of, or coincident thereto, man, in his race
toward complete annihilation, has momentarily paused to urge
more monetary considerations (the trend continues) in wrongful
death awards.
A recent case is Daggett v. Santa Fe, 48 Cal. 2d 100 (July 2,
1957) (also unusual because of the manner of impeachment in
cross examination), where the Supreme Court of California, re-
versing the District Court of Appeal, reinstated the jury verdict,
$50,000, for the loss of a three-year-old and an 18-month-old
child (the mother, driver of the automobile also deceased, held
contributorily negligent and the father, heir plaintiff, not recov-
ering for her death).
Federal courts recognize the "value" of wrongful death ac-
tions. In O'Toole v. United States, 242 F. 2d 308 (1957), the
Third Circuit affirmed a wrongful death award of $400,000 as not
excessive, a federal tort claim case, without a jury, but the cause
was sent back for re-trial because some elements of damages
were not considered; i.e., the verdict should have been larger!
See also, $125,000 wrongful death, North American Aviation,
Inc. v. Hughes, 247 F. 2d 517 (9th Cir. 1957).
$100,000 was awarded in December 1957 by an El Centro,
California Jury for the death of a mother of Mexican ancestry,
the highest award for this sex and race in a border (near
Mexico) community. See also Connie's Prescription Shop v.
McCann, 316 P. 2d 823 (Okla., 1957), $62,000 not excessive for
death of wife, mother, medical malpractice.
Aviation Law
The trend is to make this a specialty in the lawyer's practice.
There are already specialists in personal injury who do nothing
but try F. E. L. A. cases, or Jones Act cases. There is a small
group of specialists growing up in the Airplane cases.
The limitation on international crash verdicts is still unfair
to Americans, both as to amounts and as to proof of willfulness,
the latter ingredient being necessary to take this case out of the
"Warsaw Convention."
To date, the breaking of Warsaw has been almost impos-
sible. Cases are pending testing the constitutionality of Warsaw
and some lawyers have sued the pilot along with the airline,
claiming that the pilot is not covered by Warsaw. See Pierre v.
Eastern Airlines, 152 F. Supp. 486 (D. N. J. 1957) wherein the
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court held that the provisions of the Warsaw Convention limiting
recovery for passenger injury to $8,300 does not violate the
right to trial by jury as prescribed in the seventh amendment to
the United State Constitution.
Argument
To argue that a jury should "return a large verdict thereby
protecting their homes" was held error in Stafford v. Steward,
295 S. W. 2d 665 (Texas 1956). Since the suit was for both
punitive and general damages ($2000 general and $3000 punitive
returned) was the ruling not error? Punitive damages are to
punish, to set an example and certainly comments such as were
made, though improper when only general damages are pleaded,
are legitimate and relevant argument in an exemplary damage
case.
For plaintiff to argue that "Defendant isn't interested enough
to sit at the counsel table with his lawyer, . . . no concern of
his who pays the judgment" is error. It infuses insurance into
the case, Sandomierski v. Fixemer, 163 Neb. 716, 81 N. W. 2d
142 (1957).
But an important case is Haid v. Loderstedt, 133 A. 2d 655
(N. J. 1957). It is just as reprehensible and just as much error
to attempt to show that defendant is uninsured.
Refusal to Settle
The problem of plaintiff's recovery over against an insur-
ance company which failed to settle within policy limits has gen-
erally not been solved in the majority of states. The paucity of
opinions may be due to the desire of the insurance company not
to have such decisions. In Paul v. Kirkendall, 311 P. 2d 376
(Utah 1957), the Utah Supreme Court held that plaintiff obtain-
ing a $20,000 judgment on a tort claim against the defendant, who
was insured only for $10,000 policy limit, could not sue on a writ
of garnishment against the insurer for the excess, even though
he alleged that the defendant had an unliquidated tort claim
against the insurer because of negligence and bad faith in failing
to settle plaintiff's tort claim for less than the policy limits.
$4,000 demand on $5,000 policy rejected. Verdict $75,000.
Direction of verdict error, Springer v. Citizens Casualty Co. of
N. Y., 246 F. 2d 123 (5th Cir., 1957). The trend is to allow such
cases to go to the jury-and a jury does not treat kindly an in-
surance company's refusal to disgorge (in many instances) the
premiums they have swallowed.
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Discovery of Insurance Policy Limits
California first provided for plaintiff's right of discovery of
defendant's insurance policy limits and provisions in Superior
Insurance Co. v. Superior Court of L. A. County, 37 Cal. 2d 749,
235 P. 2d 833 (1951). Nevada denied the right, but Kentucky fol-
lowed California. Illinois now joins California in People of the
State of Illinois ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 145 N. E. 2d 588 (1957).
This trend, an extension of the overall discovery, is an induce-
ment to settlements and open discussions. See TRALt & TORT
TRENDS, 1955, 1956.
But for denial rulings see Peters et al. v. Webb, 316 P. (2)
170 (Okla.), State v. District Court, 277 P. (2) 536 (Mont.),
Jeppesen v. Swanson, 68 N. W. (2) 649 (Minn.), State v. District
Court, 245 P. (2) 999 (Nev.).
However, the states denying policy limits discovery may
rule otherwise if a different and more thorough showing of neces-
sity for policy provisions and amount of facts are presented to
the court of first resort. Even in the states allowing the informa-
tion, it is not "automatic."
Loss of Consortium
By recognizing a wife's right to recover for loss of con-
sortium caused by the negligent injury of her husband, Cali-
fornia, in Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 319 P.
2d 357 (Cal. 1957), rejected the outmoded majority rule, stating:
"We are not limited to a mechanical count of noses, but rather
deem it our duty to select the rule supported by logic and better
reasoning over the one supported by the mere weight of numeri-
cal authority."
In Gist v. French, 288 P. 2d 1003 (Cal. 1955), a malpractice
suit, the husband was permitted to recover for loss of consortium
of his injured wife. This case is noteworthy for its views on
"geographical expert testimony" appearing on page 1017 of the
interesting opinion. See also Acuff v. Smith, 78 N. W. 2d 480
(Iowa, 1956) recognizing the right of the wife to maintain an
action for loss of consortium caused by defendant's negligent in-
jury to her husband. Also reflecting the trend to recognize the
wife's interest in the precious intangibles comprising consortium
is Missouri Pacific Transportation Co. v. Miller, 299 S. W. 2d
41 (Ark. 1957).
The cases immediately following Hitaffer v. Argonne Coal
Co., 183 F. 2d 811 (D. C. Cir., 1950) seemed to trend away from
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any recognition of a "consortium" doctrine. The trend now is
the other way, to recognize the several types of "consortiums,"
of wife, husband, and children (part of the trend to break down
damages).
Adverse Witness Statutes
Many states have "Adverse Witness Statutes." Typical of
these is California Civil Code of Procedure, Section 2055. These
statutes permit plaintiff to call defendant or his agents and em-
ployees (some states limit to defendant and officers of the com-
pany, not employees) any time during the law suit and, not
being bound by their testimony, examine them as though under
cross-examination. One of the best and most recent discussions
is Daggett v. Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 313 P. 2d
557 (Cal. 1957).
On the subject, see also Leonard v. Watsonville Community
Hospital, 291 P. 2d 496 (Cal. 1956) an unusual decision, wherein
the court said that evidence elicited from adverse witnesses un-
der the adverse witness section is not binding on the plaintiff
and cannot be considered as plaintiff's own evidence-but then
held against plaintiff.
Where the adverse witness statutes are law, plaintiff may
put on his whole case and defendant's case (all of defendant's
witnesses) as part of plaintiff's case.
Liability of Notary Publics and Lawyers Drawing Will
It has long been established law in California that a legatee
cannot recover from an attorney who negligently prepared the
ineffective document under which such legatee claims, because
the duty the lawyer owed was to the testator, not to the legatee
(Buckley v. Gray, 42 P. 900 (1895)). Recently the California
Court of Appeal, Mickel v. Murphy, 305 P. 2d 993 (Cal. 1957)
held that a legatee under an improperly attested instrument
could not recover from the scrivener of that instrument. How-
ever, the same court now holds that a Notary Public, not a
licensed attorney, but who acted as an attorney when he drew
the will, is liable to the beneficiary for the difference between
the amount she would have received had the will been valid,
and the amount actually distributed to her on her intestate
succession, Biananja v. Irving, 310 P. 2d 63 (Cal. 1957). (Trend
toward penalizing unauthorized practices of the law.)
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Key Left in Automobile by Owner
This tort continues to perplex, most courts holding immune
the owner of an automobile who leaves his key in the ignition
accessible to a thief. The thief takes the auto, has an accident.
Pending in California and elsewhere are cases under a theory
wherein plaintiff, injured in such a situation, has sued in nuisance
against the car owner rather than negligence. See also Richard-
son v. Ham, 285 P. 2d 269 (Cal. 1955) where boys ran an un-
locked unattended bulldozer over a hill injuring third person
plaintiff and wife asleep in their homes. New trial for plaintiff
ascertained on evidentiary insufficiency after defense verdict.
Case decided on "foreseeabiity."
Are there "special circumstances," i.e., compelling factual
reasons of foreseeability, gross negligence of defendant, to take
your "key in the car case" out of the general rule? If so, plead
them and urge them in negligence with a separate count (if your
jurisdiction permits) in nuisance.
Charitable Immunity
Eleemosynary Institutions
The trend is definitely away from immunizing a charitable
defendant's tort. Some courts, although clinging to the im-
munity doctrine, hold that use of profits from operation of a
building not otherwise connected with the charitable enterprise
does not entitle defendant to immunity from tort liability arising
out of operation of the building, Blatt v. Geo. H. Nettleton Home
for Aged Women, 275 S. W. 2d 344 (Mo. 1955).
In Bing v. Thunig, 163 N. Y. Supp. 2d 3 (1957), New York
avowed the liability of a hospital for injury suffered by a patient
through the negligence of its employees. The New York rule
apparently was that recovery had depended on whether the in-
jury-producing act was administrative or medical. The Court of
Appeals in disavowing the former rule, announced, in part, "The
rule of nonliability is out of tune with the life about us, at vari-
ance with modern-day needs, and fair dealing . . .the hospital's
liability must be governed by the same principles of law as ap-
plied to all the other employers."
The New York Court also said: "The doctrine of stare decisis
was intended, not to effect a petrifying rigidity, but to assure
justice that flows from certainty and stability; if adherence to
precedent offers not justice but unfairness, not certainty but
doubt and confusion, it loses its right to survive, . . ."
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Liability of City for Jailors' Torts
Because of governmental immunity, or other statutory ad-
monitions, the city frequently escapes liability when a sheriff,
jailor or policeman injures a prisoner in his custody. Of course
the policeman may be sued, but how about the city?
A trend case is Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, Fla., 96
So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957): Plaintiff's deceased was incarcerated in
the town jail. He was stuporously intoxicated. It was contended
that he was locked in a cell and left unattended and suffered
from inhalation of smoke when the fire broke out. The Supreme
Court of Florida declared that a municipal corporation could
have no immunity from liabilities of torts of police officers; "to
continue to endow this type of organization with sovereign di-
vinity appears to us to predicate the law of the Twentieth Cen-
tury upon an Eighteenth Century anachronism." See also, an-
other Florida case, Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99 So. 2d 575
(1957). New York State was held liable for the "wanton and
negligent" conduct of a state trooper. Hayes v. State, 167
N. Y. S. 2d 566 (1957).
Assumption of Risk
The trend is away from allowing this defense. When it is
applied, courts make certain that plaintiff actually knew of the
specific risk which he is alleged to have assumed.
That the doctrine does not apply to longshoremen was re-
affirmed in Klimaszewski v. Pacific Atlantic Steamship Company,
246 F. 2d 875 (3rd Cir., 1957).
Nor does the doctrine apply to passengers aboard a com-
mercial airline. Urban v. Frontier Air Lines, 139 F. Supp. 288
(D. C. Wyo. 1956).
It was reversible error to charge a jury on assumption of
risk where one student was killed and another injured as a result
of an explosion in an auto shop class caused by a third student;
the evidence was insufficient to show that the two students knew
and appreciated the risks involved. Dutcher v. Santa Rosa High
School District, 319 P. 2d 14 (Cal. 1957).
Last Clear Chance
The doctrine, like the rescue doctrine, is rarely used. Plain-
tiff's lawyer is loath to admit plaintiff's negligence and, while he,
plaintiff's lawyer, so frequently criticizes defense counsel for re-
fusing to admit liability, he, the plaintiff's lawyer, is just as loath
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to admit his contributory negligence. But the doctrine has its
place. It's another way of pleading "wantonness" or "willful-
ness" of defendant's conduct and asserting that contributory
negligence of plaintiff is no defense.
A most unusual case tried last year was Connolly v. Pre-
Mixed Cement, 319 P. 2d 343 (Cal. 1956): Maureen Connolly was
the world's women's champion tennis player. She was riding a
horse, a gift of the City of San Diego, when a cement truck
driver rounding a corner a good block away, saw her skittish
horse and also saw Maureen wave her hand that she was in
danger. The truck ran into the side of the girl.
If ever a last clear chance was acknowledged by a defendant,
it was here, and if ever there was a plaintiff who needed this last
clear chance, it was Maureen.
The jury awarded her a verdict of $95,000.00. The District
Court of Appeals reversed this judgment on the grounds that
Maureen, not being negligent, could not invoke last clear chance!
A hearing was granted by the California Supreme Court upon
the theory that the opinion of the District Court of Appeals, in
reversing the trial court, in effect admitted defendant truck
driver was negligent, that Maureen was free from negligence
and how could an instruction of last clear chance have mislead
this jury when it would seem almost as a matter of law that
plaintiff was, in any event, entitled to a verdict? The Supreme
Court reinstated the verdict.
Res Ipsa Loquitur
Res ipsa loquitur was originally intended to "shift the sec-
ondary burden of proof" in an unusual fact situation, i.e., the
happening of an unusual event presupposed an unusual (syn.
"negligent") force. The party charged was not foreclosed from
disproving "negligence." Such is still the law, or, rather, the
rationale purported by most appellate courts. But, in practical
effects, it's not the res ipsa loquitur today "that our fathers
knew."
In some states (California), the doctrine applies even though
specific acts of negligence are pleaded and proved. In other
states, courts reason that the inference of the doctrine is not
necessary when specific proof is available. Midland Valley R.
Co. v. Conner, 217 Fed. 956 (8th Cir., 1914), O'Rourke v. Mar-
shall Field, 307 Ill. 197, 138 N. E. 625 (1925). Historically this
would seem to be correct.
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I have suggested before that the trend to liberalize and ex-
tend the res ipsa doctrine is the trend toward absolute liability
in many fields of law. Few courts have stated such reasons
openly. Many courts seem to be completely unaware of such a
motivation-present or not.
Workmen's Compensation
Liberality in this field of law trends to extend itself; how-
ever, benefits still remain, generally, unrealistic. The benefits
are so unrealistic that some courts, through the various Work-
men's Compensation boards, have considered some claims more
in the nature of a "gratuity" to be awarded if at all possible,
rather than "compensation" only to be accorded if proved to a
preponderance!
Several notable cases: A tree surgeon's heat stroke paralysis
was held compensable in Kansas, Taber v. Tole, 313 P. 2d 290
(1957). A troublesome problem of jurisdiction was answered in
Richard v. Lake Charles Stevedores, 95 So. 2d 830 (La. 1957),
wherein the longshoreman had a choice of remedy. He had either
federal or state compensation remedies. He was injured on navi-
gable waters.
Another "jurisdictional" dispute, the right to a suit over in
common law-was decided by the appellate division of the New
York court in Artonio v. Hirsh, 163 N. Y. Supp. 2d 489 (1957).
Here the corporate employers, officers and directors, who made
safety devices on the offending machine inoperative were held
to a suit at common law as third parties. The corporation was
held liable only for compensation benefits.
Then the limitation of review of a referee's findings con-
tinues its trend in Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 82 N. W. 2d, 191 (Wis. 1957).
In Edwards v. Travelers Insurance Co., 304 S. W. 2d 489
(Tenn. 1957) held that a workman's refusal to have a ruptured
spinal disc operation did not entitle his employer to suspend his
Workmen's Compensation benefits. Quaere: If this operation
ever becomes a less herculean surgical procedure, should not the
rule change?
The Supreme Court of North Carolina in King v. Arthur, 96
S. E. 2d 846 (N. C. 1947) held that an injury received during a
day worker's compulsory blood test was not compensable, the
injury not arising out of the scope and in the course of the em-
ployment, and even though the employer, pursuant to his duties
under the Board of Health regulations, had ordered employee
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to take the test. Contra-trend case, but North Carolina has pre-
served, generally, some cruel and inadequate verdicts, judgments
and appellate rulings.
A contra-trend case from Kansas is Rutledge v. Sandlin, 310
P. 2d 950 (Kan. 1957). A workman, in the course of his em-
ployment, sustained a severe blow which several months later
necessitated surgical removal of a malignant tumor. The work-
man contended that the Statute of Limitations did not begin to
run until discovery of the injury. Robb, J., held that the Kansas
statute requiring a written claim to be served within 120 days
after the "accident," began to run from the day of the blow, re-
gardless of when the resulting injury was discovered.
King v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F. Supp. 440 (E. D. Mich. 1957),
held that where plaintiff's wife received fatal injuries while in
the course of her employment, the husband could not recover
for loss of services and for funeral expenses. The Michigan
Workmen's Compensation act provides an exclusive remedy and
bars a recovery by the husband in tort.
Injuries in Utero
A decided trend is to allow an infant, if born alive, and
injured in utero or in delivery, to sue the tort feasor. This is a
definite trend away from historical common law.
A most interesting off-shoot is Stewart v. Rudner, 84 N. W.
2d 816 (Mich. 1957) in which a mother successfully sued her
physician for mental suffering, her child being stillborn. Suit
was made for breach of contract to perform Caesarean section.
Proof was made that had Caesarean section been done, child
probably would have been viable.
See also Poliquin v. MacDonald, 135 A. 2d 249 (N. H. 1957),
where the right to recover for the death of a stillborn but viable
in utero child was recognized. Important trend case.
Warranties
The trend extends in 1957 into the more frequent use of
warranties in the personal injury or tort case.
The modern trial man first should review the subject to
become acquainted with the availability of the several war-
ranties, what they are (express and implied; of the implied, the
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two: 1) merchantability, 2) for a particular purpose), their
histories, how to plead.
The big problem today in warranty is "Privity." Will the
warranty extend to others than the immediate purchasers? It
has generally in the food cases, Klein v. Duchess Sandwich, 14
C. 2d 272, 93 P. 2d 799 (1939); Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71
Cal. App. 687, 163 P. 2d 470 (1945). Will the trend continue to
include other articles of personalty? Will an "inherently dan-
gerous" doctrine arise?
I discern a definite trend towards suits vs. manufacturers
for careless or fraudulent claims in advertising, e.g., the ciga-
rette cancer cases. This type of suit is best expressed in Johnson
v. Capital City Ford Co., 85 So. (2) 75 (La. 1955): a newspaper
advertisement may create a valid contract (or warranty). "If
defendant argues that . . . the advertising offer . . . was not
in good faith and only a lure . . . the Ohio court said . . .
'there is entirely too much disregard of law and truth in the
business, social and political world today .... It is time to hold
men to their primary engagements to tell the truth and observe
the law of commerce, honesty and fair dealing'" (at p. 82). See
also 2 Negligence and Compensation Service 24 (Sept. 1957);
6 CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW 94.
Plaintiff may, for some reason, want to avoid a warranty
suit but desires to introduce the warranties, i.e., advertising as
evidence. This is the claim in certain of the cigarette cancer
suits: Plaintiff sues manufacturers for the tort "failure to warn,"
or "duty to warn how to use" etc. The warranty advertisement,
etc. then are introduced evidentiary-wise to show the failure to
warn, indeed that manufacturer, etc. positively did otherwise.
Plaintiff was severely burned when vapors created by a rubbing
ointment manufactured and distributed by defendant ignited
under plaintiff's clothing when he attempted to light a cigarette.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in a well documented opinion,
reversed both the trial court's and the intermediate court's dis-
missal of the action stating inter alia: "On the other hand, the
products may not be defective but the manufacturers and sup-
pliers may negligently fail to warn of concealed dangers with
resulting foreseeable injury; here again the courts find no diffi-
culty in sustaining liability." Contributory negligence, and fore-
seeability of harm were jury questions. (Emphasis supplied.)




The modern appellate court takes a modern and practical
approach to the intrafamilial suit. With all members of a family
generally covered by insurance, the general trend to allow inter-
family suits is not deterred by the previously urged arguments
of possible "conspiracy" to defraud the carrier.
The trend of allowing such suits is exemplified by Leach v.
Leach, 300 S. W. 2d 15 (Ark. 1957): The Emancipation Act of
Arkansas gives married women the right to sue and be sued.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas forty years ago in Fitzpatrick
v. Owens, 186 S. W. 832 (Ark. 1916), announced that a wife
could sue her husband for negligence in view of this act. The
Arkansas court now holds that this is a reciprocal right and
that the husband may sue his wife in tort. See the Leach case
supra.
Note, too, that in Ennis v. Truhitte, 306 S. W. 2d 549 (Mo.
1957) a judgment for the defendant was reversed, and a wife
was permitted to sue her husband's estate, alleging that the
deceased husband was guilty of intentional wrongdoing, negli-
gence, wilfulness, and wantonness.
Plaintiff passenger sued host driver for auto accident but
the trauma and litigation did not deter a subsequent marriage
-which did not quash the tort. Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp.,
135 A. 2d 555 (N. J. 1957).
Extension of Expert Testimony
New Experts
Daily it seems to trend that courts take more cognizance
of more experts. This isn't unusual since actually there are
more experts, i.e., specialists. Man is forever specializing rather
than generalizing in this complex world. For the courts to say
that the words of a particular artisan theretofore within the
domain of lay testimony, now come within the expert's domain
and he may give him "opinion" is only in keeping with progress.
In each new case tried, therefore, counsel should examine
whether he may not now introduce expert testimony upon a
subject heretofore solely within the domain of lay fact witnesses.
Pretrial Discovery Depositions
The trend is toward acceptance of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure everywhere and the benefits of full pretrial
conference, deposition, and discovery proceedings, oral as well
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as written interrogatories, are- being reaped by defendants and
plaintiffs alike. Some jurisdictions still cling to the old pro-
cedures, but the trend to the new rules is apparent in the in-
creased number of settlements, the cutting down on clogged
court and jury trial calendars.
In Walczak v. Detroit-Pittsburgh Motor Freight, Inc., 140
F. Supp. 10 (N. D. Ind. 1956) (45 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL,
683, 1957), defendant's attorney may refuse to reveal "privilege"
names of witnesses communicated to him by his client or learned
by him in the course of preparation for trial. The' rationale:
Diligence by an attorney in preparation for his case would re-
ward his opponent whereas a slothful preparer would neverthe-
less be an undisclosing and surprising preparer-at least at trial.
Contra trend case.
Jury Trial
While the ABA Journal, January 1958, pp. 51 et seq. has
one of the best defenses of trial by jury I've seen, I believe the
trend by more and more of the top trial men on the plaintiff
side is to try their cases 1) before Federal courts, if an election,
2) before judges rather than juries.
Federal Judges particularly are trending toward more ade-
quate awards, are fully recognizing the severability of damages,
adequately considering pain and suffering, the depreciated value
of the dollar, and the tremendous salaries and wages today paid
("salaries" have far exceeded professional "fees" in a dispro-
portionate rise).
Process
In McGee v. International Life of Texas, 78 S. Ct. 199
(1957), a Texas insurance company, not resident or otherwise
doing business in California, was effectively "served in Cali-
fornia" since it sold its policies there and the premium money
was sent from there. A trend decision in harmony with modern
communications and with interstate doing of insurance business.
Plaintiffs served the Texas company by sending the summons
registered mail from California to Texas. They took a default
judgment. The court notes how the doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U. S. 714, has "evolved" ("overruled"?).
This "evolution" is further pointed up by a Federal court's
literal interpretation of rule 4 (d) (1) in Kincaid v. Smith, 249
F. 2d 243 (6th Cir. 1957). In an action arising out of an automo-
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bile accident, papers were served on the defendant's landlady by
the marshal. A default judgment for $57,500 was entered. On
appeal, affirmed; held: (1) jurisdiction over the defendant was
acquired even though he was not personally served nor was
there any showing that the landlady delivered the papers to him;
(2) the trial court, because of the unimpressive showing by the
defendant, did not abuse its discretion under 60 (b) by denying
motion to vacate the judgment because of "mistake, inadvertence,
or excusable neglect."
See also Florio v. Power Tool, 248 F. 2d 367 (3d Cir. 1957)
where Oregon manufacturer sends an "instructor" into Penn-
sylvania. Held, doing business in Pennsylvania.
Fright
The tortuous trend toward a complete recognition of the
tort resulting in (or from) fright alone, without any bodily
touching continues. In Reed v. Moore, 319 P. 2d 80 (Calif. 1957),
damages are recognized allowable where the fright is for one's
own safety, but not if for a third person's.
Generally the law requires some "touching" accompanying
the fright. In some jurisdictions a direct fear for oneself will do.
In most jurisdictions an intentionally induced fright (as dis-
tinguished from defendant's negligent act) is sufficient.
Lessard v. Tarca, 20 Conn. Supp. 295, 133 A. 2d 625 (1957),
Preece v. Baur, 143 F. Supp. 804 (E. D. Idaho 1956), Brisboise
v. Kansas City Pub. Ser. Co., 303 S. W. 2d 619 (Mo. 1957), all
deny recovery for fright.
Burden of Proof
In one particular of trial procedure the trend is to maintain
the status quo: In the many attempts to elaborate upon burden
of proof or quantum of evidence or to introduce novelty to time
honored definitions, there have been reversals.
In Dods v. Harrison, 319 P. 2d, 558 (Wash. 1957), it was
held error to tell the jury in effect that "if they had any difficulty
in determining whose negligence had been the proximate cause
of the accident" they should find for defendants in an automobile
accident death case.
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Evidence
Demonstrative. I would be the first to admit that some
courtroom procedures characterized as "demonstrative evidence"
can, though not necessarily, result in excessive awards. But de-
fendants are too prone to lump all inflammatory courtroom pro-
cedures as "demonstrative evidence."
Unfortunately, verdicts that might otherwise have been sus-
tained, are reversed because the inflammatory slogan "demonstra-
tive evidence" is appended to the procedures at trial. Appellate
courts often overlook the question that the adequacy of the
amount is the sole consideration.
In Musgrave v. Kitchen, 157 N. Y. S. 237 (1956), a $150,000
verdict for a hand loss was upset because plaintiff's counsel re-
peatedly exhibited an artificial hand to the jury.
Is $150,000 "too much" for the loss of a hand, anyone's
hand?
Photographs. The trend is to extend their use in trial pro-
cedures. In Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Hines, 302 S. W.
2d 553 (Ky. 1957), plaintiff's verdict was reversed, the picture
taken by defendant being held conclusive over oral testimony
by the reviewing court to show plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence! Very iniportant case.
But see Atchison, Topeka & S. F. R. R. v. Barrett, 246 F. 2d
846 (9th Cir., 1957), defendant's movies showed plaintiff's
"twitchings," etc. had subsided after verdict. Judge refused to
set aside verdict.
Blood tests. A blood test of deceased for alcohol to show his
intoxication was held admissible in a civil suit by his estate. In-
teresting trend and novel, Fretz v. Anderson, 300 P. 2d 642 (Utah,
1956).
Hospital records. The trend is to allow conclusions and
hearsay into evidence when incorporated into hospital records
in such manner as to be done in the ordinary course of business
without the possibility of "extraneous motives." Admissions of
such are in the trial court's discretion, generally.
See Lewis v. Woodland, 140 N. E. 2d 322 (Ohio, 1955), the




Mortality tables. It is error to admit mortality tables when
there is no proof of permanent disability. Seaboard Air Line R.
Co. v. Ford, 92 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1956).
See the leading case Allendorf v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern
Ry., 8 Ill. 2d 164, 133 N. E. 2d 288 (1956).
Note: Mortality tables are only permissible where there is
proof of permanent injury, otherwise error. Furthermore, the
jury should be instructed to apply them only if first they find
some permanency of injury. Selman v. Davis, 95 S. E. 2d 44
(Ga. 1956).
Earning "Capacity" Not "Earnings"
A case vs. the trend is the refusal to allow loss of future
wages when plaintiff is earning more at time of trial than at
accident, Western and Atl. R. R. v. Hart, 99 S. E. 2d 302 (Ga.
1957).
The trend is to allow a non-working wife loss of earnings
in futuro, and even to infer loss of wages from type and severity
of injury in all classes of plaintiffs. The key is "capacity." It's
not what plaintiff is actually earning, if any, at trial time, but
his capacity, ability, in the future, considering, in the jury's
sound discretion, whether his type of injury would put him in
the "marginal labor market," Ridley v. Grifall Trucking Co., 136
Cal. App. (2) 682, 289 P. 2d 31 (1955).
Impeaching Juror's Verdict
The trend is away from the narrow exception that a jury's
verdict cannot be inquired or impeached except when shown to
have been result of chance.
Wright v. Bernstein, 23 N. J. 284, 129 A. 2d 19 (1957) is a
trend case: A juror falsely answered on voir dire that her mother
had only a property damage claim pending. In fact, the next case
on the calendar was a personal injury suit by the juror's mother.
On appeal, an $82,000 verdict was new trialed. See Shipley v.
Permanente Hospitals, 127 Cal. App. 2d 417, 274 P. 2d 53 (1954)
for new trial for improper jury room deliberations.
F. T. C. A.
An interesting Federal Tort Claim case is Bright v. U. S.,
149 F. Supp. 620 (E. D. Ill. 1956). A canopy from a United States
Aircraft fell, striking deceased, causing his death. United States
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District Court for the Houston District of Illinois, Juergens, J.,
held that the evidence disclosed that the pilot was negligent in
not avoiding the storm clouds and in failing to take proper pre-
caution after entering the overcast, and that the airbase was
negligent in not warning the pilot of the thunderstorm. Such
negligence resulted in the government's liability under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act.
An interesting case: U. S. v. Taylor, 236 F. 2d 649 (1956),
the government held not liable for student pilot, who, against
orders flew 300 miles from base and crashed, buzzing home town.
Dead Man's Statutes
This rule is truly an anachronism and, according to many
respectable text writers, never was intended to apply even in a
minor role in its today's starring drama defeating justice. Un-
fortunately, little legislation has dissipated the rule and many
courts still adhere to it. See McCormick, Evidence p. 142. But
the trend is definitely to limit its availability.
See Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Jones, 303 S. W. 2d, 432
(Texas 1957): a jurisdiction that has heretofore heeded the
doctrine with unwarranted respect, even in its most severe
applications.
See Gibson v. McDonald, 91 So. 2d 679 (Ala. 1956) for a
relaxation of the rule: Passenger sues driver, two cars, two
drivers, both dead. Held, passenger could testify to facts of
accident. (Interesting analogy used: the court likened the pas-
senger in the car to the same legal position as a passerby on the
sidewalk.)
Interesting case: claim v. a partnership or joint venture and
not against deceased partner alone allows admission of evidence,
Panno v. Russo, 82 Cal. App. 2d 408.
Proposed Personal Injury Law Reforms
In Gair v. Peck, 6 Misc. 2d 739, 165 N. Y. S. 2d 247 (1957),
Supreme Court Justice Stephens ruled that the appellate divi-
sion of the Supreme Court in New York did not have the con-
stitutional and statutory power to enact a rule (controversial rule
4 of the first district) which sought to regulate contingent fees
in personal injury and wrongful death cases.
In principle, I oppose the regulation of attorneys' fees. One
of the most solemn relationships in this life is that of attorney
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and client. It is recognizably akin to that of priest and con-
fessant. To say that a lawyer would cheat his client on a fee
is to say that the whole relationship is fraught with fraud. Legis-
lation cannot, piecemeal, nor generally, make of a lawyer an
honest man-if he already isn't one.
On the other side of the coin, I do recognize that some per-
sonal injury lawyers in some cities customarily charge 50% as a
contingent fee. That may in some exceptional cases be proper.
Some even "take the costs out of the client's share."
I like Professor Oleck's comment 2 in this year's TRIAL AND
TORT TRENDS on some of the well-deserved criticisms of personal
injury lawyers. I do believe we should, in our castigation of the
insurance companies and defense lawyers, confess our own mis-
deeds, when they are proved. There are some current. Unless
we so recognize them, unless we so confess them and discuss
them, neither can we be sincere nor should we be entitled to
criticize the other side of the house and profess we, alone, are
interested in the welfare of the injured man!
2 "Reforms Needed in Negligence Practice," 6 Cleve.-Mar. L. Rev. 388 (1957).
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